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ABSTRACT This study explains the ideational sources of China's proactive multilateral diplomacy towards Asian financial co-operation by employing a learning thesis. Challenging prominent materialist explanations (power-transition thesis, realist balancing thesis and economic utility thesis), this study argues that the collective learning of Chinese policy elites through cognitive dissonance, feedback effects and transnational persuasion explains much of the change in China's relational identity and philosophical beliefs regarding regional co-operation. These prior ideational shifts helped to determine China's behaviour change from its muted opposition to Asian financial co-operation in the 1990s to its active support of regional financial co-operation in the early 2000s, as evidenced in the emergence of the Chiang Mai Initiative, Chinese-Japanese-South Korean trilateral financial cooperation and the Asian Bond Fund Initiative. Chinese learning also suggests that more fundamental changes in China's national preference may make its support for Asian financial co-operation more consistent and stable in the foreseeable future than sceptics might anticipate.
Asian financial co-operation is emerging, and China is an important cause. What has motivated China to support Asian financial co-operation in recent years? Does this policy simply reflect a temporary tactic to change the interstate power configuration in China's favour as many structural realists suggest? Or is it conceivable that more fundamental changes in China's national preference will make its support for Asian financial co-operation more consistent and stable in the foreseeable future than sceptics might anticipate? This article provides an ideational explanation for China's multilateral diplomacy towards Asian financial co-operation. In so doing, it intends to shed light on the general question of whether and how a rising authoritarian power such as China can learn to co-operate in an era of economic globalization (that is, preference change).
The central argument of this study is that the collective learning of Chinese policy elites through cognitive dissonance, feedback (or legitimacy) effects and transnational persuasion explains much of the change in China's relational identity and philosophical beliefs regarding regional co-operation. These prior ideational shifts helped to determine China's behaviour change from its muted opposition to Asian financial co-operation in the 1990s to its active support of regional financial co-operation in the early 2000s. 1 More broadly, the findings have significant implications for Asian regionalism and global financial governance. Given that the support of other East Asian countries for regional financial co-operation remained largely constant in the 1990s and early 2000s, China's policy change made an important difference to the way Asian financial co-operation emerged. Without China's embrace of regional multilateralism, Asian financial co-operation could not have come into being in the early 2000s. At the regional level, the rise of new financial cooperative mechanisms would be an important step forward for an Asian regional integration project.
2 At the global level, the development of Asian regional financial co-operation would help to reduce the dependence of East Asia on International Monetary Fund (IMF) support in crisis management and finance for development, and thereby increase the autonomy and bargaining power of East Asia vis-à -vis the rest of the world, and the United States in particular. This would give Asia an added voice in affecting the shape of new global financial governance in the 21st century. Despite such important policy implications, China's approach to Asian financial co-operation has been seriously overlooked, especially when compared to other Chinese economic issues such as trade, foreign direct investment and economic reforms, as well as other subfields of Chinese foreign and security policy. What is new in Chinese policy towards Asian financial co-operation in the early 21st century? First, China has been actively participating in the construction of semi-multilateral regional financial swap arrangements under the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) since 2000. The CMI is designed to provide liquidity support for member countries that experience short-term balance-ofpayment deficits in order to prevent an extreme crisis in a country and a subsequent regional contagion. In accordance with the CMI, China signed a series of agreements with Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines addressing the regional monetary-stability fund. As of March 2005, the total amount committed by China in the signed swap arrangement reached US$11.5 billion. In May 2005, Beijing even declared that it would ''double the scale of its commitment to the CMI'' from its current level.
At the same time, China's state-run commercial banks began to form strategic trilateral alliances with their Japanese and South Korean counterparts. For example, the Bank of China signed a co-operative agreement with the Korean Exchange Bank and the Sumitomo Mitsui Bank in August 2003. This trilateral business alliance focuses on e-trade finance, settlement service, investment supports and project financing in the three countries. Likewise, the China Development Bank also agreed to establish the Northeast Asia Development Financing Council with the Korea Development Bank and the Mizuho Bank in May 2004. According to the trilateral agreement, the Financing Council would contribute to co-ordinating development project financing and establishing advanced financial infrastructure in the region. In addition to the trilateral strategic alliance, the Chinese government also allowed the central banks of South Korea and Japan to open regional offices in Beijing in 2003.
Meanwhile, China has also been actively participating in the creation of the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) since 2003. The establishment of the ABF ultimately aims, first, to bring back the huge amount of Asian foreign reserves that were traditionally saved in Europe or in the US to be used in bond investments throughout Asia, and second, to shield the region from external vulnerabilities by building more robust and diversified local capital markets. The member countries of the ABF include Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. With its close consultation with the mainland Chinese government, Hong Kong's monetary authority has been in charge of the ABF as the incumbent chairman of the financial market working group of the Executives' Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks. Hong Kong was also chosen by the meeting's member countries as the preferred centre for the initial listing of the Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF). In May 2005, the Chinese government approved the PAIF to trade on the Chinese interbank bond market -bonds issued by Chinese banks.
Why has China come to join and promote Asian financial co-operation in recent years? For example, given China's concern about the influence of Japan in the region, why did it support and implement the Japan-initiated regional financial swap arrangement in 2000 (the CMI) after being sceptical about it for the past decade? This is in contrast to China's muted opposition to the Japanproposed idea of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), the Asian version of the IMF, in 1997. This puzzle has an important bearing on a broader phenomenon that has emerged in Chinese foreign policy since the late 1990s: China's increased tendency to engage multilateral institutions and arrangements at the regional level. China has actively engaged new regional multilateral arrangements, such as the ASEAN + 3, China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, Shanghai Co-operation Organization and Asian Community Summit. This is a striking departure from China's long-standing emphasis on autonomy and independence. In the past, China was concerned that in multilateral settings it would be outvoted and its bargaining power decreased. 4 With respect to regional multilateralism, it suspected that Japan would use regional co-operation to secure raw materials and markets, and enhance its influence in the region.
5 China therefore took a minimalist and passive approach to Asia-Pacific regional co-operation prior to the late 1990s. Hence its active embrace of recent Asians-only regional co-operation 6 remains a puzzle that defies the conventional wisdom about Chinese foreign policy. The phenomenon can be best explained by the learning model developed in this study. In order to measure Chinese learning on Asian regional financial cooperation, this study traces the views of a carefully chosen group of Chinese policy elites during the 1990-2005 period. They include the top officials in the Politburo, the Ministry of Foreign affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation, the Ministry of Finance, the People's Bank of China, as well as analysts in the government-controlled media (such as the Xinhua News Agency) and academic institutions (such as the Chinese Academy of Social Science). By closely monitoring the views of these policy elites and by comparing relevant individuals and groups over time, the present study examines evidence of state learning. It attempts to avoid some of the elementary pitfalls of research on learning by specifying the time period and by defining and measuring behaviour and beliefs in non-tautological ways. Nevertheless, one of the key methodological problems is the fact that Chinese leaders' public statements and journal articles may be more like attempts to influence the audience rather than genuine beliefs. This study seeks to reduce such distortions by relying on internally circulated weekly governmental archives, interviews and contemporaneous public statements by officials. Greater credibility is given to internal documents and to unrehearsed and personally expressed views for which there is no clear self-serving political motive. In 2004, I also conducted interviews with more than 40 key Chinese specialists in the field of Chinese security and economic policy, and Korean and Japanese government officials who were engaged in dialogue with their Chinese counterparts to complement the documentary evidence.
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It is important to note that this study focuses on the centre point of governmental views, that is, the consensus representing the view of dominant policy elites within the government, rather than the views of particular elites. Although the study does not assume the Chinese state as a unitary actor, its 4 primary concern is not the specific content of lessons learned by particular individuals, but changes in governmental consensus. 8 It attempts to capture such governmental consensus over time by looking at internal documents, white papers, the journals of government-sponsored institutes and governmentcontrolled media editorials representing the basic guidelines for Chinese foreign policy. For reasons of space, I focus on explaining why China's new regional policy emerged on the issues of international finance, rather than describing what it was. The first of the article's three sections briefly examines the explanatory power and limitations of the prominent materialist explanations, and shows how the learning explanation can complement and outperform these explanations. The second section discusses the sources of Chinese learning in the late 1990s with respect to Asian regional co-operation. The last section explains the substance of Chinese learned ideas and its causal relationship with China's foreign financial policy behaviour in the early 2000s.
Materialist Alternative Explanations and their Limitations
This section critically reviews prominent alternative hypotheses, such as the power-transition thesis, realist balancing thesis and economic utility thesis. These materialist alternative hypotheses have some explanatory power. To the extent that the alternative explanations dismiss learning dynamics, however, they suffer from theoretical indeterminacy and empirical anomalies.
A first materialist hypothesis is that China's increasing relative material power allows it to gain more self-confidence and thereby participate in regional multilateral mechanisms to shape the rules of international relations in its favour. This explanation falls within a power-transition version of realism. 9 However, its main problem is that, at least conceptually, there is no clear reason why a rising power (such as China) should participate in many multilateral institutions and arrangements, given the possibility that reigning powers (such as the United States, Japan and Australia) would dominate the rising power in multilateral settings. 10 In addition, it is also conceptually plausible that the logic of increasing material power can go in two opposite directions. Increasing power might allow state actors not merely to value but also to disvalue multilateral diplomacy (as in the case of the recent US unilateralism under the Bush 8 Although the anecdotal evidence I collected suggests that there is no perceptible division across Chinese bureaucratic agencies over Asian financial co-operation, it is hard to reject completely the bureaucratic hypothesis given the limited documentary evidence available to us. When new information becomes available, we will be able to assess whether the bureaucratic thesis might have the value-added in explaining the puzzle in my case study. administration). The degree of material power alone cannot point to any particular policy direction. A second competing explanation is the realist balancing thesis. From the realist perspective, external pressures could encourage China to adopt more cooperative postures in regional multilateral arrangements, including financial cooperation. There are at least two strands of the realist balancing thesis. One emphasizes China's intention to balance against the United States and Japan in the region. For example, as Thomas Christensen aptly notes, China's increased fear of American bilateral diplomacy, such as the US-Japan alliance in the region since 1996, led it to view some form of multilateralism as a more effective means to counterbalance these two powers.
11 Another variant of the realist hypothesis maintains that China's embrace of Asian financial co-operation was driven by its need to reduce ''China threat'' perceptions in the region by showing its benign behaviour.
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However, such realist explanations leave the puzzle of the timing of China's promotion of regional multilateral financial co-operation. If it is simply a balance-of-power (or threat) consideration that determines China's foreign financial policy behaviour, one would expect it to employ financial multilateralism much earlier than it did in the 2000s. But the evidence is somewhat puzzling. China did not support the idea of the AMF -which, incidentally, Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN countries supported -during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. The realist view would predict that China's security concerns regarding American bilateral alliances would lead it to endorse the AMF, and thereby improve its relationship with its neighbours. This behaviour of opposing the AMF is also inconsistent with China's expected policy adaptation to show more co-operative behaviour, thus reducing ''China threat'' perception which had circulated in the region throughout the 1990s A final materialist hypothesis stresses the economic utility of regional financial co-operation for China. This argument maintains that China decided to co-operate in order to gain economic benefits. However, there is no obvious sign that economic rationale directed China to seek regional multilateral options which it had been uneasy with in previous decades. First, China had no pressing need for additional liquidity from the region. At the end of 2001, China's central bank, together with Hong Kong's monetary authority, had reserves of over US $300 billion, more than enough for an economy that enjoys the additional safety net of comprehensive capital controls. 13 Moreover, for China, other unilateral, bilateral and global options would be sufficient to prevent and manage potential financial crises. It is unclear to what extent any regional financial co-operative mechanism would benefit China in a strict economic sense. Thus it is not evident that China faced an economic imperative of regional multilateralism to tackle potential international financial problems. Two questions stand out from this review. First, how can we resolve the indeterminacy of the materialist alternative explanations on the question of the timing of Chinese ideational (or discourse) and behavioural (or practice) changes? Second, given that economic and security imperatives do not point to any particular policy option (that is, a regional multilateral option versus unilateral, bilateral or global options), how can we explain the direction of Chinese ideational and behavioural changes?
Learning I: The Source and Process of Ideational Change
For the purposes of this study, state learning is defined as changes in the centre ground of governmental views as the result of, first, experience or study of past policy and crisis, and second, dialogue with the transnational epistemic community. The primary focus of the study is on changes in articulated Chinese policy elites' identities and beliefs on international affairs in general, and regional economic co-operation in particular. In this study, I divide state learning into two conceptually distinctive processes for analytical purpose: learning I (ideational change) and learning II (behavioural change). Learning I concerns the question of whether and how state learning occurs. This is about the source of ideational changes. Learning II addresses the question of whether and how the learned ideas can affect policy behaviour. This is about the consequence of ideational changes.
14 What has driven ideational change? We can trace the cognitive source and process of China's learning in the following three interrelated processes: cognitive dissonance, feedback (or legitimacy) effects, and transnational persuasion.
14 One can conceptually distinguish learning from adaptation. Adaptation does not involve any fundamental changes in cognitive structures. According to this view, foreign policy decision-makers simply respond to environmental change by using instrumental rationality. See Alastair Iain Johnston, ''Learning versus adaptation: explaining change in Chinese arms control policy in the 1980s and 1990s,'' The China Journal, No. 35 (1996) . His sophisticated dynamic model marked a departure from the existing perception-matter-research tradition in Chinese studies, which tended to sidestep questions about the dynamic process of ideational changes. While this excellent work served as a reference point for the more recent studies of Chinese foreign policy, further refinement is possible. First, the dichotomy between adaptation and learning may be overdrawn. In practice, initial adaptation to environment may lead to new world-views and constitute (incremental) learning. This view was shared by many contributors to David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). Secondly, it is difficult to measure environmental changes, a concept that ''adaptation'' highlights. The term ''environmental change'' is often too fluid and diverse for rigorous empirical testing. Even when it is narrowly defined, for instance, as a shift in material distribution of power in the international arena, its real causal effect on behaviour often depends on the actor's interpretation of it. Thus the line between structural and cognitive variables becomes more blurred than the adaptation thesis supposes. Beijing's cognitive dissonance with the help of vivid information and the desirability of new ideas (two favourable ideational conditions) triggered a nationwide wave of intensive debates and studies of the Asian financial crisis and global (and regional) political economy among Chinese officials and intellectuals. For example, China's State Council held an unusual high-level National Finance Work Conference in Beijing on 17 November 1997 to discuss the problems of China's financial and banking system. Participants in the meeting included not only officials from the central bank at the national and provincial levels, China's state-owned banks, and many non-bank financial institutions, but also all provincial governors and provincial-level finance officials and several members of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo. Likewise, the CCP Central Committee convened a special session on financial security on 12 May 1998. The CCP Central Committee even organized a training course on finance for senior Party and government officials from provinces, autonomous regions, military area commands and central departments in January 1999. This domestic learning could set the stage for the emergence of new governmental ideas, such as a ''pan-Asian identity'' and a ''positive-sum view'' (discussed in the next section).
Cognitive dissonance

Feedback (or legitimacy) effects
Feedback effects can occur on the organizational level. When the policy proposed by actors receives a positive feedback, their political legitimacy and influence may increase within the government. Accordingly, their ideas are more likely to contribute to state learning. Conversely, when actors' policy ideas are seen as responsible for failed policies, they will lose their political legitimacy and influence, and their ideas became less salient within the government. 20 In this respect, organizational learning is a political as well as a cognitive process. Ideas can help determine the balance of power among competing factions within the government. China's positive evaluation of earlier multilateral diplomacy allowed it to feel more confident and comfortable with the idea of regional multilateral financial co-operation. As Tang Shiping (唐世平), 21 a prominent foreign policy analyst at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences put it, China's participation in regional multilateralism created ''a self-reinforcing virtuous cycle propelling China's regional strategy.'' According to Tang, ''positive policy outcomes from the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 10+1/10+3, and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization have all strengthened the voice of integrationist or institutionalists, leading to call for more active participation in regional multilateral initiatives.'' Likewise, recent scholarly works 22 point to a considerable change in China's attitude towards regional multilateral security co-operation, from outright rejection or suspicion in the early 1990s to active support in the late 1990s through China's experience of the ARF. According to some Chinese interviewees in a Shanghai-based policy community, 23 those who initially promoted the idea of proto-multilateralism gained more credit and attention from the top leadership who became increasingly convinced that this would serve China's national interest. The new ideas of multilateralism were increasingly seen by the Chinese leadership as desirable for the national interest.
As the proto-multilateral activists were perceived to be responsible for policy success, they could exert even more political influence within Chinese policy circles and have been continuously encouraged to offer creative policy ideas to the leaders since the late 1990s. This indicates certain types of feedback effects at the Chinese organizational level. Such feedback effects contributed to increasing the level of confidence in regional multilateralism (including Asian financial cooperation) with which China had been uneasy in the past decades.
Transnational persuasion
On the international level, ideational change can take place through international contact and persuasion. Persuasion involves the non-coercive communication of ideas. Transnational persuasion can lead to common knowledge or homogenization of interests. Thus it can reduce the gap between actors' ideas. In the case of Asian financial co-operation, from the late 1990s, China's neighbouring countries had facilitated its learning by attempting to persuade it of the common benefits of regional co-operation, and providing knowledge and lessons. Given China's inexperience of international financial management, the availability of these new ideas from outside could facilitate the diffusion of new ideas to Chinese policy elites. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the ASEAN+3 helped to transmit new ideas of Asian financial co-operation in the late 1990s. These two multilateral frameworks provided a useful avenue for discussing Asian financial co-operation more frequently. For example, Asian countries discussed the Japanese-proposed idea of a new Asian currency regime composed of a basket of currencies in ASEM's London meeting in 1998. Similarly, the ASEAN+3 first met to discuss the establishment of a permanent regional fund in January 1999. The increased frequency of interactions among Asian countries over common concerns and interests could provide better information about the benign nature 24 This is in contrast to the case where Japan proposed the AMF without consulting China in 1997. Another effect of the ASEAN+3 and the ASEM process is that transnational dialogues helped to develop a pan-Asian identity among Asian countries, including China. The ASEAN+3 (Asians-only grouping) contributed to an increased sense of group differentiation between East Asia and others, resulting in solidarity among East Asian members. Interestingly, the ASEM also helped to consolidate a pan-Asian identity. As each ASEM discussion requires Asia to take a co-ordinated position vis-à -vis the relatively uniform EU, Asia had more incentive to create a collective Asian identity within the framework. 25 In short, the increased frequency of China's interactions and dialogues with its neighbours in the post-Asian financial crisis period also laid a solid foundation for the emergence of China's new identity and philosophical beliefs about international affairs.
Learning II: Causal Relationship between Learned Ideas and Policy Behaviour
As the next step of the learning process, this section discusses causal pathways between learned ideas and policy behaviour. For analytical purposes, the present study focuses on two distinctive ideational dimensions: relational identity (ingroup/out-group differentiation) and philosophical beliefs (world views). Such notions here are used to denote more fundamental ideational shifts which go beyond changes in instrumental beliefs (means/ends calculation).
Relational identity
The key causal process in behaviour is in-group/out-group differentiation. In social identity theory, 26 self-categorization tends to produce competitive behaviour with out-groups, as it leads to a positive evaluation of in-groups and a negative assessment of out-groups. Meanwhile, a growing in-group identity increases solidarity and thereby co-operation among members of a group. For instance, a relational identity could help a country to interpret and internalize the new information provided by its in-group countries. The same information can be interpreted differently depending on whether it came from like-minded people or devalued others: information from friends is more persuasive than that from strangers.
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In Chinese policy discourse in the early 1990s, many Chinese analysts largely used the terms ''Asia Pacific'' grouping (including the United States and the (former) Soviet Union) or ''West Pacific socialist'' grouping (including China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, Mongolia, Laos and Vietnam). 28 In the first half of the 1990s, there were very few accounts of an Asians-only grouping in Chinese discourse. But in the late 1990s the differentiation of East Asia versus others became more salient. China's experience with the Asian financial crisis contributed to an increasing sense of a pan-Asian identity within the Chinese leadership, and its discontent with the IMF-prescribed solutions to the crisis reinforced its resentment against perceived Western arrogance and triumphalism. In East Asia, including China, there was a strong sense that the West in general, and the United States in particular, used the Asian financial crisis to advance a particular economic agenda aimed to serve selfish interests. 29 In
Beijing's view, the IMF approach dismissed the importance of the noninterference and independence principle shared by almost all regional states that had bitter experiences with (semi) colonial rule, big-power intervention and treaty orchestration by the major powers during the Cold War. 
Philosophical belief
Another important causal process between ideas and behaviour is related to actors' ontology and epistemology: how the world works. Philosophical beliefs allow actors to interpret the external world, and affect the valuation of the material or social incentives for particular action. Put differently, philosophical belief refers to something deeper going on behind the scenes of actors' instrumental calculations (or means/ends calculation). Moderate positive-sum views were increasingly becoming the dominant Chinese view on international affairs from the late 1990s. 35 China's cognitive dissonance following the Asian financial crisis helped it to appreciate the downside of economic globalization. That is the problem of ''economic security.'' 36 China realized that globalization is a double-edged sword (shuangdao jian 双刀剪), possibly leading to a destabilized economy and aggravating the North (developed countries)-South (developing countries) divide unless it is properly managed. Chinese leaders began to hold the view that maintaining economic (and financial) security in an era of globalization is crucial for political stability and CCP regime survival. Then President Jiang Zemin (江泽民) emphasized that to safeguard state economic security, China must first safeguard the security of finance because the normal operation of the financial system is extremely significant to the whole economy. 37 An increasing number of Chinese leaders also seemed to believe that there would be growing space for potential co-operation to deal with the common problems of economic security such as international financial contagion. In October 1998, for example, Dai Xianglong (戴相龙), the then Governor of the People's Bank of China, mentioned that rapid economic globalization and the resulting Asian financial crisis led the international community to share concerns about economic security, and realized the need of state participation to strengthen the architecture of international financial governance.
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This attitude contrasts with China's primary focus on ''relative gains'' and ''asymmetric interdependence'' in the early 1990s. For instance, some leading Chinese analysts believed that the North (beifang guojia 北方国家) could have more gains and less dependence than the South (nanfang guojia 南方国家). From this perspective, China as a developing country (in the South) should be cautious about its entry into regional economic co-operative mechanisms such as an East Asian Economic Caucus. 39 This view was also supported in part by a Chinese internal document which evaluated the costs and benefits of Mexico's entry into the North American Free Trade Agreement. According to this analysis, the participation of Mexico (a developing country) in the Agreement produced negative effects in the sense that it undermined less competitive domestic industry and increased Mexico's asymmetric interdependence vis-à -vis the United States and Canada (two advanced economies). 40 In the Chinese discourse of the late 1990s, however, the term ''positive sum'' (as opposed to the term ''zero sum'') became more salient, providing additional favourable conditions for China's active embrace of regional financial co-operation.
On a related point, there is China's growing awareness of the ''security dilemma'' in the late 1990s. The security dilemma theory supposes that mutual suspicion between two or more adversaries can cause each side to take defensively motivated measures that are seen by others as an offensive threat. This can provoke a vicious spiral of tension and counter-measurement. In China's case, little was written about notions such as ''security dilemma'' and ''positive sum'' in the first half of 1990s. 41 More specifically, prior to the late 1990s, many Chinese analysts believed that the China threat theory originated from the vicious intentions of other countries, rather than its interaction with others in the world. In 1993, for instance, a Chinese analyst argued that the United States intended to use the China threat theory as a tactic to deflect the attention of the international community away from American intervention in Asian affairs such as arms sale to Taiwan. 42 In 1996, a renowned Chinese strategist, Yan Xuetong (阎学通) also omitted security dilemma dynamics from his discussion of the origin of the China threat theory. 43 44 this concept is characterized by notions such as ''common security,'' ''co-operative security'' and ''comprehensive security.'' With globalization, countries are ''more interdependent on one another for security,'' and no country can achieve its security without co-operation. As Zhang Yunling (张 蕴岭), president of the China Association for Asia-Pacific Studies and a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference noted, the new security concept clearly recognized that China's behaviour could cause other states to be concerned about its rising power. 45 Alastair Iain Johnston's case study also shows that some Chinese policy elites were becoming believers in security dilemma dynamics and the utility of regional multilateralism to deal with the security dilemma. 46 Such growing positive-sum views and increased awareness of the security dilemma helped China to recognize the value of regional multilateralism. More specifically, these new philosophical beliefs encouraged China to take more active approaches to Asian financial cooperation in the early 2000s. Despite political tensions between Japan and its north-east Asian neighbours over historical issues and disputed islets, the three economic powerhouses of the region -China, Japan and South Korea -have managed to keep intergovernmental financial co-operation on track in the first half of the 2000s. This reflects the resilience of Beijing's new thinking on regional multilateral co-operation. Prior to China's official endorsement of the ABF in June 2003, some Chinese analysts were concerned about Japan's influence in the regional bond market. Nevertheless, this did not impede China's growing proactive diplomacy towards regional financial co-operation. Zhong Wei (钟伟), director of Beijing Normal University's International Finance Research Center and a senior government consultant on Chinese foreign financial policy claimed that ''if China actively supports the move for an Asian bond market, the Japanese yen will dominate the proposed market and assets valued in yen will become the biggest gainers. China cannot get big direct benefits.'' However, he added, ''the proposal to set up such a common market is highly valuable, and it needs the continuous efforts and close co-ordination of all participants.'' 47 Similarly, He Fan (何帆), a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said that ''even if Japan eats the biggest portion of the cake, China should take part as the country itself can obtain benefits. '' 48 These remarks demonstrate that an absolute-gain consideration (or positivesum view) took precedence over a relative-gain consideration (or zero-sum view) within the Chinese foreign financial policy community regarding Asian financial co-operation. Beijing's rationale for its promotion of the ABF, as summarized by leading Chinese policy elites in their internal government report, is worth quoting at length:
Even if substantial progress happens to be made in the ABF in the near future, our country [China]'s economic benefit would be very limited … The ABF has more political, indirect, and long-term than economic, direct, and short-term importance … China's active participation and leadership in the development of the ABF would not merely improve China's international environment and peaceful development, but also help to retains substantial flexibility to extract itself from Asian regional co-operation should the need arise. If the exit costs are low, then the issue of Chinese national preference is more significant for the future trajectory of Asian regional cooperation than sceptics initially believed. The learning explanation focuses directly on the nature and scope of changes in Chinese national preference.
My findings of Chinese learning suggest that despite a set of potential political and economic constraints confronting Asian regional co-operation, 51 China's proactive support for such co-operation will be more consistent and stable in the future than sceptics might think. This is not to say that China's attempted financial co-operation will necessarily lead to successful financial co-operation in the region. The direction of policy change should not be confused with its actual results, not least because the final outcome can be greatly influenced by many international and domestic factors as well as historical contingency. Nevertheless, China's learning and subsequently new national preference is more likely to continue to encourage it to play a leading role in creating and consolidating the new Asian financial arrangements in the foreseeable future. To extend this logic, one may even cautiously anticipate that China's new national preference will help to maintain the momentum of its proactive multilateral diplomacy towards other dimensions of regional co-operation, such as the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, Boao Forum, Shanghai Co-operation Organization, Six-Party Talks and Asian Community Summit.
